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The digital economy has become increasingly consolidated in recent years as a
handful of companies (namely Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon) have come
to dominate every corner of the internet. Several of these companies have attained
such size and influence that labelling them monopolists seems unavoidable. These
companies have reinvigorated the debate regarding how antitrust law should treat
monopolists. Many scholars, typically associated with the Chicago School of antitrust, believe that courts should hesitate before taking action against internet monopolists because judicial intervention may discourage investment in the digital
economy without benefiting consumers. Critics of the Chicago School meanwhile argue that internet monopolists pose a unique threat to competition by virtue of their
control of user-generated data.
This Comment argues that monopolists’ ability to restrict data access poses a
grave and novel threat to competition. Two recent cases, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn
Corp and Authenticom, Inc v CDK Global LLC, highlight the risk of dominant internet companies prohibiting public data scraping to quash competitors and cement
their monopolies. This Comment argues that courts should apply the Sherman Act
“refusal to deal” doctrine to proscribe public data scraping prohibitions under specific circumstances. Applying refusal to deal liability to scraping prohibitions would
create a more dynamic and open digital economy. It would also be an incremental
expansion of antitrust liability, which would not dissuade digital investment or otherwise cause massive economic disruption. Finding refusal to deal liability for data
scraping prohibitions would therefore allow courts to employ their common law process and adapt the Sherman Act to meet new competitive challenges in the digital
economy.
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INTRODUCTION
Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon
have attracted controversy for their growing influence on our social, political, and commercial activities. Some commentators
worry that these companies’ ability to gather data and control
who accesses it threatens the competitive health of the digital
economy.1 This trend could harm consumers by stifling innovation
in online products and by producing a digital economy with fewer
choices and fewer competitors determined to win consumers’ business. Some advocate for more robust antitrust enforcement to

1
Internet companies have been scrutinized recently for leveraging their data to
quash competitors. For example, leaked internal documents show that Facebook has selectively denied rivals access to its “trove of user data” whenever it felt they could pose a
serious threat. See Olivia Solon and Cyrus Farivar, Mark Zuckerberg Leveraged Facebook
User Data to Fight Rivals and Help Friends, Leaked Documents Show (NBC, Apr 18, 2019),
archived at http://perma.cc/72Q5-GS52.
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combat internet monopolists and argue that the antitrust laws
should play a larger role in checking restrictions on data access
that harm competition.2
Data access restrictions are particularly concerning because
data is central to the digital economy.3 Collecting data helps internet companies understand their customers in order to more efficiently market their products. It also allows them to perform analytics to improve their technology and yield economic insights.4
Not surprisingly, companies go to great lengths to access data.
They often purchase it from other internet companies or through
brokers.5 Alternatively, some firms have developed methods to
gather public data—that is, data posted on the internet without
password protection reserving it for specific users—on a massive
scale.6
One such method is data (or web) scraping, which involves
software applications, called “bots,” that efficiently collect information from across the internet. By automating the web browsing
process, scraping bots gather data in the same format as it appears on a user’s computer screen.7 Scraping bots serve an indispensable function for internet companies ranging from analytics

2
See, for example, Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big
Data, 59 Ariz L Rev 339, 380–81 (2017); Maurice E. Stucke, Should We Be Concerned about
Data-opolies?, 2 Georgetown L Tech Rev 275, 275–80, 283–85 (2018) (outlining potential
harms associated with internet monopolists absent vigilant antitrust enforcement).
3
See Rubinfeld and Gal, 59 Ariz L Rev at 343 (cited in note 2). Some politicians
have argued for radical antitrust remedies, like breaking up internet companies, to limit
their ability to stifle competition. See Astead W. Herndon, Elizabeth Warren Proposes
Breaking Up Tech Giants Like Amazon and Facebook (NY Times, Mar 8, 2019), archived
at http://perma.cc/KZ8B-Q53Y.
4
See Tom Symons and Theo Bass, Me, My Data and I: The Future of the Personal
Data Economy *34 (European Commission Decode Project, Sept 2017), archived at
http://perma.cc/W6YR-ZEJZ (proposing that internet companies could use data-generated
insights to provide services ranging from “shopping, banking, transport, work, health and
social networking”).
5
Brian Naylor, Firms Are Buying, Sharing Your Online Info. What Can You Do
about It? (NPR, July 11, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/BV4C-HWJ7.
6
See Adrian Agius, Legal Perspectives on Scraping Data from the Modern Web (Law
in Society, Oct 23, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/6J3H-B7C5; Aaron Rubin and Tiffany
Hu, How Website Operators Use CFAA to Combat Data-Scraping (Law360, Aug 25, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/6V98-7JUS.
7
See Jeffrey Kenneth Hirschey, Note, Symbiotic Relationships: Pragmatic Acceptance of Data Scraping, 29 Berkeley Tech L J 897, 897–98 (2014). Scrapers gather diverse data from across the internet and compile it in a structured and usable format. To
that end, they typically write custom scripts for each website they scrape, or they employ
premade scraping tools that are compatible with many different websites and forms of
data. Hoda Raissi, What is Web Scraping? (insideBigData, Jan 26, 2019), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z4DT-KA4C.
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startups to the internet’s most established firms. Search engines,
such as Google and Bing, use web crawler bots to catalog public
websites.8 Analytics startups draw insights for industries, ranging from finance to retail, using public data gathered by bots.9 Estimates show that bots account for nearly one quarter of all internet traffic, and they have contributed significantly to the web’s
development.10
But not all bots are benevolent—some bad actors scrape data
for destructive purposes. For example, they scrape information
from websites to create knockoff versions or gather users’ contact
information to pester them with unsolicited marketing campaigns.11 Furthermore, internet users and website providers
agree to specific terms and conditions regarding data privacy.
Scrapers that gather users’ personal information may use that
data for purposes outside of those agreed-upon terms, so companies that fail to prevent scraping may lose their users’ trust.12
Accordingly, companies operating public websites take defensive measures to control who can scrape data and what they may
collect. Some public websites, for example, employ technical defenses such as click-through agreements,13 IP address blockers,14

8
See
How
Search
Organizes
Information
(Google),
archived
at
http://perma.cc/CUX2-SQA6 (explaining how web crawlers rely on links on websites to
discover publicly available webpages and render the content of the pages to create a Search
index).
9
See Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, DuckDuckGo, and Internet Archive in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 1716783, *21–22 (9th Cir filed Nov 27, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 5757674)
(Electronic Frontier Foundation Brief) (noting that a wide variety of internet products,
including search engines, news aggregators, public safety tools, and web archives, depend
on scraping bots).
10 See id at *5. Some sources estimate that bots account for as much as half of all
web traffic. See, for example, Marissa Boulanger, Note, Scraping the Bottom of the Barrel:
Why It Is No Surprise That Data Scrapers Can Have Access to Public Profiles on LinkedIn,
21 SMU Sci & Tech L Rev 77, 78 (2018).
11 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Craigslist, Inc in Support of Defendant/Appellant
LinkedIn Corp, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 17-16783, *1–2 (9th Cir filed Oct 10,
2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 4698991) (Craigslist Brief).
12 See Hirschey, Note, 29 Berkeley Tech L J at 899 (cited in note 7) (“Scraping may
collect personally identifying information (‘PII’) thought to be private and can have serious
privacy implications.”).
13 See id at 910. A click-through agreement requires the user to click on an “acceptance icon,” in order to consent to being bound by the website’s terms of use. See Ian
Rambarran and Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They Are Wrapped Up to
Be?, 9 Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop 173, 174 (2007).
14 See Hirschey, Note, 29 Berkeley Tech L J at 909 (cited in note 7). See also, for
example, Facebook, Inc v Power Ventures, Inc, 844 F Supp 2d 1025, 1031 (ND Cal 2012)
(noting that Facebook employs IP address blocks to restrict access to its website).
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and robot exclusion protocol15 to discourage specific scrapers.
Firms also use nontechnical measures such as website “terms and
conditions” and “cease and desist” letters to dissuade certain
scrapers from accessing their websites without permission.16 Finally, companies try to sanction data scrapers for unauthorized computer entry under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act17 (CFAA).
While there are legitimate reasons to prohibit data scraping,
firms may prevent their competitors from scraping to deny them
access to information and hinder their ability to compete. If internet monopolists shut off data access to reduce competition, we
may turn to the antitrust laws, and specifically the antimonopolization provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act,18 to protect
the competitive health of the digital economy. Whether the Sherman Act proscribes data scraping prohibitions is an open question. Some argue that the Act’s “refusal to deal” doctrine should
prevent monopolists from using scraping prohibitions to deny
their competitors access to public data.19 Others argue that mandating access for data scrapers under the Sherman Act would
force internet monopolists to accommodate their rivals, which
would weaken, rather than promote, digital competition.20
This Comment analyzes whether it is legal under the Sherman
Act for an internet monopolist to prohibit competitors from scraping
public data from its website and concludes that the Sherman Act
should be interpreted to forbid that behavior under specific
circumstances. Part I discusses the Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 Robot exclusion protocol, or robots.txt, is a “text file that . . . instruct[s] search engine bots . . . how to crawl and index website pages.” Sergey Grybniak, Best Practices for
Setting Up Meta Robots Tags and Robots.txt (Search Engine Journal, Mar 15, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/7WGW-3ZM4.
16 See, for example, Power Ventures, 844 F Supp 2d at 1028, 1031 (noting Facebook’s
use of website terms and “cease and desist” letters to keep out unwanted users). See also
hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 273 F Supp 3d 1099, 1104 (ND Cal 2017) (noting LinkedIn’s
use of “cease and desist” letters and terms of service to bar data scrapers).
17 Pub L No 99-474, 100 Stat 1213 (1986), codified as amended at 18 USC § 1030.
The CFAA proscribes computer access “without authorization.” 18 USC § 1030(a).
Whether the statute bans only computer hacking or any unwanted visit to a company’s
website is hotly contested. See Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping and the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 24 BU J Sci & Tech L 372, 397–408 (2018). Companies
hosting copyrighted information on their websites can also pursue liability under 17 USC
§ 1201 for scrapers who gather data subject to exclusive intellectual property protections.
18 26 Stat 209 (1890), codified as amended at 15 USC §§ 1–7.
19 See Part III.A. See also, for example, Brief for Amicus Curiae Scraping Hub, Ltd
in Support of Affirmance, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 17-16783, *20 (9th Cir filed
Nov 27, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 5757675) (Scraping Hub Brief).
20 See, for example, Dennis W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and
Refusal to Deal—Why Aspen and Kodak are Misguided, 68 Antitrust L J 659, 671–76 (2001).
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which proscribes monopolization, and analyzes competing theories (namely the Chicago School and its critics) regarding the
proper scope of the Sherman Act in the digital economy. Part II
describes the development of the Sherman Act refusal to deal doctrine, which imposes liability on monopolists, under limited circumstances, when they fail to accommodate smaller competitors.
This doctrine could serve as a tool to combat internet monopolists’
restrictions on public data access.21 Furthermore, Part II discusses recent cases that suggest these restrictions may invite refusal to deal liability. Part III then argues that refusal to deal liability for anticompetitive data scraping prohibitions is necessary
to prevent internet monopolists from stifling access to public information in order to solidify their dominant positions. In addition, the Part outlines factors that courts must consider when analyzing those prohibitions under the Sherman Act and proposes a
standard for their adjudication. This Comment concludes by noting the importance of finding Sherman Act liability for anticompetitive scraping prohibitions for the competitive health of the
digital economy.
I. THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
The Sherman Antitrust Act is the centerpiece of the American antitrust regime.22 Its two operative provisions, Sections 1
and 2, prohibit unreasonable restraints of trade and monopolization, respectively.23 The language of both provisions is sweeping
and unspecific, such that the Act has been compared to the United
States Constitution for its brevity and breadth.24 Much like constitutional law, antitrust law is crafted through a common law
process. Courts shape rules applying the Sherman Act’s broad

21 See, for example, Autorité de la Concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, Competition
Law and Data *17–18 (2016) (noting the slim possibility of refusal to deal liability in data
access cases under European competition law); Zachary Abrahamson, Essential Data, 124
Yale L J 867, 872–75 (2014) (arguing monopolist’s restrictions on data access could invite
refusal to deal liability); Sean Howell, Big Data and Monopolization *18–22 (unpublished
manuscript, Jan 28, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/9U2T-HLUZ (discussing how digital platforms might risk liability for refusal to deal data in rare circumstances).
22 See
The Antitrust Laws (Federal Trade Commission), archived at
http://perma.cc/S3ZD-RQ67.
23 15 USC §§ 1, 2.
24 See Jay Dratler, Licensing of Intellectual Property: A Brief Primer of Antitrust Law and
Misuse Doctrine § 5.02 at 5-5 (Law Journal Press 2019) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court
has likened the Sherman Act to the Constitution of the United States in its generality.”).
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prohibitions through incremental trial and error.25 This Part discusses Sherman Act jurisprudence. Part I.A outlines the fundamentals of Sherman Act § 2 law. Part I.B then analyzes how that
law has developed and the schools of thought regarding the direction it should take in the digital economy.
A.

Section 2 Prohibitions against Monopolization

Section 2 provides that “[e]very person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to monopolize . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”26 Taken at face value,
its language could proscribe a firm’s possession of monopoly
power,27 but courts have never found it to extend that far.28 Furthermore, courts do not understand Section 2 to prohibit acquisition of monopoly power through superior business practices. The
antitrust laws were intended to promote competition so that consumers could benefit from an economy that delivers low prices,
robust supply, and innovative products.29 It would be counterproductive to discourage firms from competing to acquire market
share for fear of running afoul of the Sherman Act. Accordingly,
the Supreme Court interprets monopolization to require both the
possession of monopoly power in a given market and the “willful
acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historical accident.”30 “Willful acquisition”
25 “[T]he courts, and not the legislature, really make the law of antitrust. This fact
reflects the common-law system of justice generally prevailing in the United States.” Id.
Antitrust enforcement agencies have also influenced antitrust law. See Department of
Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act *1–2 (Sept 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/YD26-V5EA.
26 15 USC § 2.
27 Monopoly power is typically defined as “the power to control prices or exclude competition.” United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 351 US 377, 391 (1956). See also
Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 US 2, 13–14 (1984) (defining market
power as the “special ability . . . to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do
in a competitive market”). Concluding that a firm has monopoly power typically requires
defining the relevant market for antitrust analysis. There is an expansive body of law not
covered by this Comment regarding market definition, but broadly speaking, the relevant
market for antitrust analysis is defined based on the “area of effective competition.” Brown
Shoe Co v United States, 370 US 294, 324 (1962).
28 See United States v Aluminum Co of America, 148 F2d 416, 430 (2d Cir 1945)
(Alcoa) (explaining that size alone does not violate the Sherman Act because “[t]he successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins”).
29 See Pacific Bell Telephone Co v Linkline Communications, Inc, 555 US 438, 451
(2009) (explaining that the antitrust laws are meant to promote aggressive competition in
the market).
30 United States v Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 570–71 (1966).
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requires gaining market dominance through exclusionary, anticompetitive conduct.31
However, the requirement that monopoly conduct be “exclusionary” helps little in determining what behavior violates Section 2. Aggressive competitive behavior that benefits consumers
is often indistinguishable from exclusionary conduct that reduces
long-run competition and consumer welfare.32 Consider, for example, a monopolist’s decision to undercut its competitors’ prices. If
the decision benefits consumers by lowering prices, it could be
procompetitive. However, the decision could be predatory if it
harms consumers by letting the monopolist drive out rivals with
the intention of raising prices over time. Courts, relying on imperfect information, often struggle to determine which view is
correct.33
Because of this uncertainty, courts risk committing false positive and false negative errors whenever they condemn conduct
under Section 2. Wrongly proscribing behavior discourages businesses from competing, whereas failing to condemn exclusionary
conduct allows monopolists to crush rivals before they can viably
compete.34 Furthermore, distinguishing exclusionary conduct
from aggressive competition imposes significant decision costs on
fact finders.35
Courts and scholars differ in their tolerance of decision and
error costs when evaluating exclusionary conduct. They have developed several tests for identifying exclusionary practices. For
example, they have (1) assessed the net effects of the conduct on
competition (effects-balancing test), (2) conducted a weighted
comparison of competitive effects and condemned conduct only
when it is disproportionally anticompetitive (disproportionality

31 Examples of exclusionary conduct include tying, exclusive dealing, and predatory
pricing. See generally Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, the
Rule of Reason, and the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 Antitrust L J
435 (2006).
32 See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 Notre Dame
L Rev 972, 972 (1986) (“Courts should condemn [exclusionary conduct] under the antitrust
laws. There is only one problem. Competitive and exclusionary conduct look alike.”).
33 See Alcoa, 148 F2d at 431 (determining that preemptively investing in new opportunities was a form of exclusionary conduct, although it could easily be characterized as
aggressive competition).
34 See Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 NYU L Rev 1, 61–68 (1994) (discussing the significant costs
of false positives, false negatives, and adjudication in the antitrust context).
35 Easterbrook, 61 Notre Dame L Rev at 977 (cited in note 32) (“[T]he legal system
must minimize the sum of error and process costs.”) (emphasis in original).
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test), (3) determined whether the conduct involved a “profit sacrifice” (profit sacrifice test), (4) assessed whether the conduct excluded equally efficient rivals (equally efficient competitor test),
(5) questioned whether conduct makes no sense based on economic principles (no economic sense test), and (6) proscribed obviously anticompetitive practices as per se illegal.36 These standards vary in their administrability and the extent to which they
encourage antitrust intervention.
B.

The Chicago School and Its Critics

For several decades, the Chicago School of antitrust has influenced how antitrust law is interpreted and enforced, particularly with respect to defining exclusionary conduct.37 The Chicago
School emerged as a reaction to the interventionist antitrust regime of the 1960s and 1970s, under which enforcement actions
against monopolies were launched on purportedly tenuous economic grounds.38 The Chicago approach, which remains the dominant view, is skeptical of vigorous antitrust enforcement and
aims to protect the competitive process rather than individual
competitors. It elevates maximizing consumer welfare as the ultimate goal of the antitrust laws and is predicated on neoclassical
economics, which espouses faith in market efficiency and skepticism toward government interference in the economy.39
Proponents of the Chicago School advocate for restraint in
Section 2 enforcement on the grounds that courts lack the institutional capacity to act as central planners and reliably distinguish exclusionary conduct from aggressive competition.40 They
claim markets provide a more robust check on monopolists’ abuse of

36

See Competition and Monopoly at *viii–x (cited in note 25).
See George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago School on
Modern Antitrust Law, 57 J L & Econ 1, 1–2 (2014).
38 See id at 4.
39 See Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 69–71
(Basic Books 1978). Some scholars counter that the Sherman Act was intended to address
harms from market concentration apart from economic inefficiency, such as unfair wealth
transfers from consumers to big business or corporations’ political influence. See Robert
H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 Hastings L J 871, 888 (1999).
40 See Joshua D. Wright, Overshot the Mark? A Simple Explanation of the Chicago
School’s Influence on Antitrust, 5 Competition Pol Intl 1, 11 (2009) (noting the Chicago
School’s emphasis on minimizing judicial error). See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol 439, 442 (2008) (“Anyone who thinks that judges would be good at detecting the few situations in which cooperation would do more good than harm has not studied the history of antitrust.”).
37
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dominance than courts because, if monopolists charge supracompetitive prices or fail to innovate, they will be swept away by new entrants through the process of “creative destruction.”41 We can, therefore, expect monopolists to generally avoid exclusionary conduct
out of self-interest.42 Accordingly, in the Chicago view, courts
should take action under Section 2 only when monopolists exhibit
obviously predatory behavior.43
The Chicago School approach has received increased criticism in recent years.44 Opponents claim that fear of false positives
has given cover to monopolists’ predatory behavior and has contributed to an increasingly consolidated economy.45 They argue
that Chicago School adherents place too much confidence in economic orthodoxy and the neoclassical assumptions underpinning
their approach, which are out of touch in the digital economy.46 As
examples, they point to internet behemoths, such as Google,
Facebook, Amazon, and LinkedIn. These businesses operate
multi-sided platforms, which link groups of consumers and sell
different products to each group. Facebook, for example, provides
advertising to companies and social networking to internet users.47 These platforms benefit from direct and indirect network
effects, meaning demand for their services is influenced by the
number of users they serve.48 For example, the more professionals
that create LinkedIn profiles, the more attractive the platform is

41 Easterbrook, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 440 (cited in note 40). See also generally
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper 1942).
42 See Easterbrook, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 440–41 (cited in note 40).
43 For example, Robert Bork, one of the Chicago School’s “elder statesmen,” considered exclusion through predatory pricing implausible but was more receptive to theories
of nonprice predation. Bork thought that a monopolist may raise its rivals’ costs, for instance, by imposing exclusive dealing arrangements on its customers, thereby denying
competitors sufficient volume to pose a threat. See Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills,
Antitrust Predation and The Antitrust Paradox, 57 J L & Econ 181, 195–96 (2014).
44 See, for example, The University of Chicago Worries about a Lack of Competition
(The Economist, Apr 12, 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/NUX7-HSXC.
45 See How Regulators Can Prevent Excessive Concentration Online (The Economist,
June 28, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/H7BS-QCNB.
46 See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 Yale L J 710, 790 (2017) (outlining various ways the neoclassical school overlooks novel forms of anticompetitive conduct in online markets). See also Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics
of the Control of User Data, 31 Yale J Reg 401, 402–04 (2014); Spencer Weber Waller, The
Language of Law and the Language of Business, 52 Case W Res L Rev 283, 304–10 (2001)
(cataloguing critiques of the Chicago School’s approach).
47 Lapo Filistrucchi, et al, Market Definition in Two-Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10 J Competition L & Econ 293, 296–97 (2014).
48 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20
Yale J Reg 325, 331–34 (2003).
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to other professionals who might consider joining LinkedIn (direct
network effect). Additionally, the more professionals that join
LinkedIn, the more attractive the platform is to employers considering advertising on it (indirect network effect). These network
effects help internet platforms attain market power and resist
competitive threats because they dramatically increase the benefits of size and create a virtuous cycle that rewards first movers.49
Relatedly, critics of the Chicago School argue that a conservative antitrust regime equating consumer harm with high prices is
ill-suited to a data-driven economy, in which many of the world’s
most powerful companies offer products for free.50 They believe
the Chicago School’s fixation with price as the metric of consumer
harm ignores that monopolists offering free products can still
harm consumers by displacing more creative or proconsumer rivals.51 Toothless antitrust enforcement, for example, may allow
internet monopolists to underinvest in innovation and abuse their
customers’ data privacy in a manner that new entrants in a competitive market would not. This seems plausible given incumbent
tech firms’ poor track record on privacy in recent years. Indeed,
tech giants committed several high-profile privacy blunders in
2018 alone, ranging from Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica data
breach to Google and Facebook’s secret purchases of users’ financial data.52
Furthermore, critics note that viably competing in the digital
economy increasingly requires data access.53 Dominant internet
platforms stay ahead of the competition by developing superior
algorithms, and they rely on access to data to train and improve
49 See, for example, Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Debunking the Myths
over Big Data and Antitrust, 2 CPI Antitrust Chron 1, 6 (“[N]etwork effects, at times,
enable big firms to become bigger until they dominate the industry.”); Newman, 31 Yale J
Reg at 403 (cited in note 46) (“[N]etwork effects grant competitive advantages that undercut simple analyses of ‘equilibrium’ prices.”). See also Khan, 126 Yale L J at 772 (cited in
note 46) (noting that first-mover advantages and network effects create considerable entry
barriers in platform industries).
50 See, for example, Stucke, 2 Georgetown L Tech Rev at 281 (cited in note 2) (“The
presumption is that ‘lower prices improve consumer welfare (all else being equal).’ Since
data-opolies are not raising prices above competitive levels (or reducing output below competitive levels), some may question if they even possess monopoly power.”) (citation
omitted).
51 See, for example, id at 279–80.
52 See Bennett Cyphers, Gennie Gebhart, and Adam Schwartz, Data Privacy Scandals and Public Policy Picking Up Speed: 2018 in Review (Electronic Frontier Foundation,
Dec 31, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/426H-EGV2.
53 See Abrahamson, 124 Yale L J at 870–72 (cited in note 21) (arguing that, in some
contexts, data is an essential input to viable competition).
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those algorithms.54 Consequently, multisided platforms can leverage their size and information-gathering capabilities (enabled by
network effects) to control data stocks and flows. By denying rivals access to data, they can quash competitive products and cement their dominance.55 Critics, therefore, conclude that current
Section 2 enforcement fails to check digital monopolists.
Proponents of the Chicago School counter that internet monopolists and their control of data do not mandate a new antitrust
regime. They claim that data access cannot pose a significant barrier to entry because data is replicable, nonrivalrous, and exceedingly abundant, and its value is not innate but dependent on the
algorithms that analyze it.56 Furthermore, they find it unlikely
that internet platforms harm consumers when they offer products
for free and are skeptical of alleged entry barriers from restrictive
data access policies when users can abandon monopolists just by
typing in a competitor’s web address.57 They believe Sherman Act
intervention under these circumstances is likely to discourage

54 See Symons and Bass, Me, My Data and I at *25 (cited in note 4) (“Access to personal data is important because it is the primary feedback loop through which companies
can generate and test new innovations and service improvements. Crucially, monopolisation of data matters because the more data a firm has on performance, the more it can
improve performance.”). See also Frank Pasquale, Paradoxes of Digital Antitrust: Why the
FTC Failed to Explain Its Inaction on Search Bias *7 (Harv J L & Tech Occasional Paper
Series, July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/AU3S-53H9 (arguing that access to data
has been integral to Google’s development of superior search algorithms).
55 See Rubinfeld and Gal, 59 Ariz L Rev at 349–68 (cited in note 2) (arguing there
are legal, technological, and practical barriers to entry that monopolists can use to deny
competitors access to data and stifle competition). See also Symons and Bass, Me, My Data
and I at *24 (cited in note 4) (“The control of data by companies . . . contributes to market
dynamics which mean those companies can become unassailable monoliths.”).
56 See, for example, D. Daniel Sokol and Roisin Comerford, Antitrust and Regulating
Big Data, 23 Geo Mason L Rev 1129, 1137 (2016) (“Data is non-exclusive and nonrivalrous. No one firm can, or does, control all of the world’s data.”); id at 1139 (“Data does
not typically provide value on a standalone basis.”). See also Joe Kennedy, The Myth of
Data Monopoly: Why Antitrust Concerns about Data Are Overblown (Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, Mar 2017), archived at http://perma.cc/643Q-ABY8.
57 See, for example, Robert H. Bork and J. Gregory Sidak, What Does the Chicago
School Teach about Internet Search and the Antitrust Treatment of Google?, 8 J Competition L & Econ 663, 665 (2012) (“Search engines epitomize dynamic competition—the virtuous cycle in which innovation drives competition, which further drives consumerwelfare-enhancing innovation.”). See also id at 671 (“Because the use of a search engine is
free, users can easily switch from one engine to another if they are dissatisfied with the
results provided.”). The belief that entry barriers would not significantly encumber internet competition because users can seamlessly navigate among rival websites is best encapsulated by the expression “competition is one click away.” David Wismer, Google’s
Larry Page: “Competition is One Click Away” (and Other Quotes of the Week) (Forbes, Oct
14, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2RW7-TX7U.
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monopolies from competing without alleviating consumer
harms.58
Lastly, the Chicago School’s proponents and critics disagree
about whether current Sherman Act doctrines are sufficient to
combat threats to competition in the digital economy. Critics argue for adopting new doctrines or expanding existing ones while
the Chicago School’s proponents have faith in current Sherman
Act enforcement tools to address new antitrust concerns.59 Those
who advocate for more robust antitrust enforcement often point
to the refusal to deal doctrine, under which monopolists are compelled to accommodate their rivals, as a means to check restrictions on data access that impede competition.60 By contrast,
Chicago School adherents particularly disfavor that doctrine, as
they believe mandating data sharing on refusal to deal grounds
would temper internet monopolists’ incentives to compete and stifle competition in the digital economy.61
In sum, the Chicago School’s faith in the free market as a
check against monopolists and its preference for restraint in antitrust enforcement have shaped modern antitrust law. Those
principles are now under attack by critics who believe that dominant technology companies pose a unique threat to competition.
Critics argue that incumbent digital platforms benefit from network effects, first-mover advantages, and command over stores of
data that make entry of new competitors unlikely. They advocate
for more expansive antitrust liability to combat digital monopolists, and this Comment contends that these critics have the better side of the argument. Indeed, this Comment argues that refusal to deal liability, which is disfavored by Chicago School
adherents, provides a solution. Part II analyzes refusal to deal liability and its recent applications in the digital context. Part III

58 See Geoffrey A. Manne and Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J Competition L & Econ 153, 164–68 (2010) (arguing that antitrust intervention
can be particularly ill-advised in innovative economic sectors due to the high risk of error).
59 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 Antitrust L J 925, 925
(2001) (“[T]here is indeed a problem with the application of antitrust law to the new economy, but [ ] it is not a doctrinal problem; antitrust doctrine is supple enough, and its commitment to economic rationality strong enough, to take in stride the competitive issues
presented by the new economy.”).
60 See Abrahamson, 124 Yale L J at 870–72 (cited in note 21).
61 See Bork and Sidak, 8 J Competition L & Econ at 683 (cited in note 57) (arguing
that the essential facilities doctrine would be inappropriate for regulating internet giants
like Google).
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argues that this form of liability offers an incremental step toward remedying the competitive threat posed by data access
restrictions.
II. REFUSAL TO DEAL LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 2 AND ITS DATA
SCRAPING IMPLICATIONS
Sherman Act liability for a monopolist’s refusal to deal with
its direct competitors is a controversial doctrine that has been
cited as a possible tool to combat exclusionary restrictions on data
access.62 Generally, monopolists incur liability under Section 2
when their behavior affects the integrity of the market.63 Monopolists’ unilateral decisions typically do not run afoul of the
Sherman Act because companies are generally free to choose how
and with whom they do business.64 However, courts have found
unilateral conduct exclusionary under certain circumstances; a
monopolist refusing to deal with competitors in a manner that
harms competition is one example.65
Liability for refusal to deal attracts controversy because the
antitrust laws are designed to promote competition, rather than
cooperation, and compelling a monopolist to engage with competitors offends the principle of firm independence.66 Antitrust law,
consequently, does not recognize any general obligation to deal
with competitors. Most antitrust experts agree that even monopolists typically have no duty to accommodate rivals, and their

62 For opposing perspectives on the continuing vitality of the refusal to deal doctrine,
compare Easterbrook, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 441–42 (cited in note 40) (arguing that
the refusal to deal doctrine was the “last gasp” of the economically unsound, pre–Chicago
School of antitrust), with Abrahamson, 124 Yale L J at 870–71 (cited in note 21)
(arguing that refusal to deal liability should be appropriate for data access under certain
circumstances).
63 For example, monopolists incur liability for illegally tying product sales or prohibiting their customers from dealing with rivals. See Novell, Inc v Microsoft Corp, 731 F3d
1064, 1072 (10th Cir 2013).
64 Id (“By contrast, and ‘as a general rule . . . purely unilateral conduct’ does not run
afoul of section 2—‘businesses are free to choose’ whether or not to do business with others
and free to assign what prices they hope to secure for their own products.”).
65 See Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585, 601 (1985) (“The
absence of an unqualified duty to cooperate does not mean that every time a firm declines
to participate in a particular cooperative venture, that decision may not . . . give rise to
liability in certain circumstances.”).
66 See Carlton, 68 Antitrust L J at 659 (cited in note 20) (“[T]he antitrust laws are
premised on the simple notion that rivalry among firms benefits consumers, yet a doctrine
of a duty to deal clearly limits that rivalry.”).
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choice to deny competitors their business should not be condemned lightly.67
However, experts disagree about when refusals to deal are
exclusionary. Some even argue that the risk of false positives and
administrative difficulties innate to refusal to deal liability outweigh any procompetitive benefits, such that the doctrine should
be retired. Others counter that dogmatic commitment to the principle of firm independence gives cover to monopolists that suppress competition by stonewalling competitors.68 Supreme Court
precedent has limited refusal to deal liability to rare circumstances, but there is some indication that courts may employ the
doctrine when monopolists bar access to data, for example,
through scraping prohibitions. Part II.A discusses the development of the refusal to deal doctrine. Part II.B analyzes recent
cases that suggest refusal to deal liability may obtain when digital monopolists prevent rivals from scraping public data.
A.

Section 2 Liability for Refusal to Deal

Courts have imposed refusal to deal liability under two theories. First, they have applied the intent to monopolize test, in
which they ask whether the defendant intended to create or maintain a monopoly by refusing to engage with its competitor. Second, some lower courts have allowed refusal to deal liability under
the “essential facilities” doctrine, through which a monopolist is
liable for denying access to a resource that is essential to downstream competition.69 The Supreme Court has never endorsed the
essential facilities doctrine. Consequently, the seminal cases for
refusal to deal precedent apply the intent test.

67 The Antitrust Modernization Commission concluded that refusal to deal liability
should be deployed only rarely because it could reduce firms’ incentives to compete. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations *101 (Apr 2007), archived
at http://perma.cc/4HZG-UDHA.
68 For a discussion regarding the spectrum of views on refusal to deal liability, see
Competition and Monopoly at *125 (cited in note 25). See also Testimony of Carl Shapiro,
Exclusionary Conduct (Antitrust Modernization Commission, Sept 29, 2005), archived at
http://perma.cc/5X7E-Q4RC.
69 2 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 25.04 (LexisNexis 2d ed 2019).
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1. Early Supreme Court refusal to deal precedent.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power Co v United
States70 first acknowledged Sherman Act liability for a monopolist’s refusal to deal in a manner harmful to competition. The defendant, Otter Tail, had a monopoly in the electric power market
in parts of Minnesota, North Dakota, and South Dakota.71 Some
towns in the area sought to supplant Otter Tail with competing
power companies. Otter Tail declined to sell power to those towns
and refused them access to its power lines to receive electricity
from rival proprietors. The Supreme Court found that Otter Tail
had used strategic dominance to “foreclose potential entrants” in
violation of Section 2.72
After Otter Tail, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
made refusal to deal liability a viable tool for Section 2 enforcement. Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp73 represents the high point of the Court’s refusal to deal jurisprudence.74
In Aspen Skiing, the plaintiff, who owned one of four ski resorts
in the Aspen area, sued the defendant, who owned the remaining
three resorts, for alleged monopolization under Section 2. For several years, the plaintiff and defendant jointly offered tickets allowing skiers to access any of the four resorts. One year, the defendant refused to sell tickets in conjunction with the plaintiff,
even refusing to sell to the plaintiff at retail prices.75 The Supreme
Court concluded that while there is no general duty for monopolists to cooperate with rivals, that freedom is not unlimited.76 The
Court held the monopolist had not only refused to do business
with its competitor but had terminated a long-standing practice
that satisfied consumer demand. Ending the cooperative venture
harmed consumers and precluded the plaintiff from viably competing. The evidence suggested that, by refusing to sell the plaintiff tickets, the defendant intended to maintain a monopoly.77 Because the defendant offered no valid business reason for its

70

410 US 366 (1973).
Id at 368.
72 Id at 377, 382.
73 472 US 585 (1985).
74 “Refusal to deal doctrine’s high water mark came in Aspen.” Novell, 731 F3d
at 1074.
75 Aspen Skiing, 472 US at 587–96.
76 Id at 601.
77 Id at 605–11.
71
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decision, the Court condemned the refusal to deal as exclusionary
under Section 2.78
In Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services,79 the Court
again recognized liability for a monopolist’s refusal to deal. In
that case, Kodak refused to sell replacement parts to a competitor
offering repair services for Kodak products, allegedly to exclude
that company from the repairs market.80 The Court followed
Aspen Skiing in holding Kodak would be liable under Section 2 if
its refusal had exclusionary effects that could not be explained by
valid business justifications.81
2. Trinko constrains the refusal to deal doctrine.
The Court subsequently limited the refusal to deal doctrine
in Verizon Communications, Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,
LLP.82 In that case, Verizon was unsuccessfully sued for providing
telecommunication services to clients of its competitors on a discriminatory basis.83 The Trinko opinion is notable for its Chicago
School overtones, particularly its suggestion that forcing monopolists to share resources through refusal to deal liability could
harm consumer welfare by chilling competition.84 The opinion also
suggests that antitrust intervention in the market has the tendency to cause more harm than good.85 Channeling the Chicago
view, the Trinko Court described Aspen Skiing as “at or near the
outer boundary of § 2 liability” and reaffirmed that there is no
general duty to deal with competitors.86 Before imposing refusal
to deal liability, the Trinko Court wanted some indication that
the monopolist had foregone short-term profits to reduce long-run
competition.87
Several concerns motivated the Trinko Court’s decision to
limit the refusal to deal doctrine. First, Verizon had not engaged
in a voluntary “course of dealing” with its rival because it would

78

Id at 608–11.
504 US 451 (1992).
80 Id at 464–65.
81 Id at 483.
82 540 US 398 (2004).
83 Id at 402–06.
84 Id at 414.
85 See Easterbrook, 31 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 446 (cited in note 40) (citing the Trinko
decision as evidence of the Chicago School’s influence on Section 2 jurisprudence).
86 Trinko, 540 US at 409.
87 Id at 409–10.
79
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not have dealt with the plaintiff, absent a statutory obligation.88
The Court made clear that a voluntary relationship was fundamental to liability under Aspen Skiing. Second, the Court worried
that far-reaching refusal to deal liability would turn courts into
central planners, requiring them to set prices, quantities, and
terms of service.89 The Court preferred that anticompetitive
harms be “irremediable by antitrust law when compulsory access
requires the court to assume the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.”90 Third, the Court doubted the benefits
of enforced sharing, especially because compelling monopolists to
deal with rivals could engender collusion, which the Court considered the “supreme evil of antitrust.”91 Fourth, the Court worried
that enforced sharing could disincentivize investment, harming
consumers in the long run because imposing an obligation to deal
could reduce the allure of monopoly profits and dissuade innovation.92 Fifth, the Court questioned the incremental value of antitrust enforcement when a regulatory regime already exists to prevent anticompetitive harms (in this case, there was already a
statutory framework that required Verizon to offer access to telecommunication services).93 Lastly, the Court preferred to set clear
antitrust rules that help companies accord their behavior with
the law, which is difficult to do in highly fact-dependent refusal
to deal cases.94
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Trinko’s principles in Pacific
Bell Telephone Co v Linkline Communications, Inc95 by holding
that internet service providers had no duty to deal with competitors and could not be compelled to provide service on their competitors’ preferred terms.96 The Court emphasized the Trinko
principles of providing clear antitrust rules and keeping courts
out of the business of supervising commercial relationships.97

88

Id at 409.
Id at 408.
90 Trinko, 540 US at 415 (alternation omitted), citing Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L J 841, 853 (1990).
91 Trinko, 540 US at 408.
92 Id at 407–08.
93 Id at 412.
94 See Competition and Monopoly at *17–18 (cited in note 25).
95 555 US 438 (2009).
96 Id at 449–50.
97 Id at 452.
89
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3. Post-Trinko applications of the intent to monopolize test.
After Trinko, lower courts have generally taken the Supreme
Court’s lead and limited the scope of refusal to deal liability. For
example, in Novell, Inc v Microsoft Corp,98 the Tenth Circuit denied Section 2 liability when Microsoft declined to license its software to rivals.99 Following Trinko, the court imposed onerous evidentiary requirements to find refusal to deal liability. First, the
monopolist and the competitor must have a preexisting and profitable course of dealing. This lessens the risk that courts will encourage collusion by compelling competitors to interact and reduces the administrative strain of courts setting commercial
terms out of whole cloth.100 Second, the circumstances must suggest the monopolist is willing to forsake short-term profits to
achieve anticompetitive ends. This requires not only evidence of
lost profits but also of the monopolist’s anticompetitive intentions
and lack of valid business justification. The court acknowledged
that this standard is exacting and possibly underinclusive but argued that it is better to err on the side of firm independence because there is proven value in allowing firms to compete.101
Similarly, in MetroNet Services Corp v Qwest Corp,102 the
Ninth Circuit denied refusal to deal liability for a telecommunications carrier that changed its pricing structure to limit arbitrage.103 The court emphasized the Trinko Court’s concern that
false positives would chill competition.104 The court further noted
that a regulatory regime existed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harms caused by telecommunications companies and that
any “additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small” under those circumstances.105
The Ninth Circuit also held in Aerotec International, Inc v
Honeywell International, Inc106 that the defendant, who manufactured aircraft components, did not attempt to monopolize the

98

731 F3d 1064 (10th Cir 2013).
Id at 1080–81.
100 Id at 1074−75.
101 Id at 1075−77.
102 383 F3d 1124 (9th Cir 2004).
103 MetroNet’s challenged conduct prevented its customers from buying telecommunication services at wholesale rates and reselling them for a profit. Id at 1126−27.
104 Id at 1136.
105 Id at 1134−35, citing Trinko, 540 US at 412.
106 836 F3d 1171 (9th Cir 2016).
99
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aircraft repair services market by refusing to deal with its competitors.107 The court reiterated the logic of the Trinko decision
(and channeled Chicago School principles) by finding that enforced sharing could reduce investment incentives, liability for refusal to deal would turn courts into central planners, and enforced
sharing would invite collusion.108 The court confirmed its standard from MetroNet by holding that refusal to deal liability should
exist when the “only conceivable” rationale for the refusal is sacrificing short-term benefits to obtain long-run profits from
exclusion.109
4. Essential facilities doctrine.
In addition to the intent test, some courts have analyzed refusal to deal liability under the essential facilities doctrine. Unlike the intent test, the essential facilities doctrine imposes liability based on the nature of the denied resource, rather than on the
monopolist’s exclusionary motives in the particular case. While
the Supreme Court has never defined nor adopted the doctrine,
the Seventh Circuit in MCI Communications Corp v AT&T Co110
articulated the elements of an essential facilities claim. For liability under the essential facilities doctrine, the plaintiff must
show “(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist; (2) a
competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the facility.”111 The
court in MCI worried that a monopolist in possession of an essential facility could create a bottleneck. In deciding whether to impose liability, the court asked whether denying use of the facility
would impede or destroy competition in downstream markets.112
Although the doctrine generally applies to physical infrastructure, some courts have applied it to intellectual property or even
digital assets.113
107

Id at 1175−77.
Id at 1183.
109 Id at 1184.
110 708 F2d 1081 (7th Cir 1983).
111 Id at 1132−33.
112 Id.
113 See, for example, Corsearch, Inc v Thomson & Thomson, 792 F Supp 305, 332−33
(SDNY 1992) (finding that a trademark database was not an essential facility because
competitors could replicate it at substantial, but not prohibitive, cost); Intergraph Corp v
Intel Corp, 195 F3d 1346, 1358 (Fed Cir 1999) (finding that the plaintiff’s dependence on
the defendant’s superior product did not turn the defendant’s product into an essential
108
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The Supreme Court has not expressly disavowed the essential facilities doctrine but, by consistently relegating discussion of
it to dicta (and casting aspersions on its propriety), the Court has
sown doubt regarding its validity.114 Furthermore, some criticize
the doctrine because it provides defendants with insufficient opportunity to explain their allegedly anticompetitive behavior
through valid business justifications.115 The doctrine is also criticized for failing to provide guidance regarding what constitutes a
facility and when denying access risks liability.116 Additionally,
defining a resource as essential effectively classifies the defendant as a utility or common carrier, which likely strikes courts as
an extreme measure with uncertain consequences.117
To summarize, the Supreme Court has steadily limited the
scope of refusal to deal liability in recent decades. The Trinko decision narrowly cabined the doctrine, such that liability under either the intent test or essential facilities doctrine only attaches in
limited circumstances. However, Aspen Skiing remains good law,
and there is some indication that courts may apply refusal to deal
liability to check abuses of dominance in the digital content.118

facility). See also Spencer Weber Waller and William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76 Antitrust L J 741, 745–58 (2010) (observing that the European Union,
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Israel, Canada, and other countries recognize some
version of the essential facilities doctrine).
114 See Brett Frischmann and Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 Antitrust L J 1, 3 (“[T]he Supreme Court has dealt with the essential facilities
doctrine through an apparent strategy of death by dicta, all but disavowing its prior case
law on the subject.”); id at 9 (“[T]he Court in Trinko appeared to go out of its way to restrict,
and nearly reject, the essential facilities doctrine.”). See also Trinko, 540 US at 410−11
(“This conclusion [no liability] would be unchanged even if we considered to be established
law the ‘essential facilities’ doctrine crafted by some lower courts . . . . We have never recognized such a doctrine . . . and we find no need either to recognize it or to repudiate it
here.”) (citation omitted).
115 Evaluating whether providing access to a facility is feasible under the essential
facilities doctrine requires “difficult judgments about the impact of forced sharing on the
efficient and safe functioning of the facility.” See Competition and Monopoly at *128 (cited
in note 25).
116 Id at *127–29.
117 See Frischmann and Waller, 75 Antitrust L J at 21 (cited in note 114) (“Infrastructure theory helps us identify when facilities are . . . candidates for open access via essential
facilities or other related doctrines, such as common carriage.”).
118 See, for example, FTC v Qualcomm, 2019 WL 2206013, *81–85 (ND Cal) (citing
Aspen Skiing favorably and concluding that Qualcomm has a duty to license its standardessential patents to rival modem chip suppliers). But see generally FTC v Qualcomm, 2019
WL 3977818 (9th Cir) (staying the injunction and noting disagreement between the FTC
and the DOJ regarding whether Qualcomm has a duty to deal).
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Recent Data Scraping Cases with Refusal to Deal
Implications

Internet platforms have occasionally been challenged for allegedly exclusionary conduct.119 Courts have been hesitant to impose liability under Section 2, possibly for fear of discouraging innovation in the digital economy or because the anticompetitive
threat that internet monopolists pose is only slowly becoming understood.120 Two recent cases addressed the competitive implications of internet platforms controlling access to data. They discussed the antitrust concerns that arise when firms use data
scraping prohibitions to shut off access to public information.
Both cases addressed the possibility that refusal to deal liability
could attach in those circumstances, but neither thoroughly engaged with the case law to adjudicate the issue.
In hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp,121 hiQ, a start-up that gathered and analyzed data from public LinkedIn profiles,122 sued
LinkedIn, a professional networking platform, for preventing hiQ
from data scraping.123 After hiQ had collected and processed
LinkedIn data for several years, LinkedIn implemented IP blocks
targeting hiQ’s bots and sent hiQ a “cease and desist” letter in
2017, demanding hiQ to stop scraping LinkedIn’s data. LinkedIn
claimed that further data collection would be unauthorized entry
on its servers in violation of the CFAA.124
hiQ argued that the prohibitions were an abuse of LinkedIn’s
dominance under California’s Unfair Competition Law125 (UCL),
which incorporates federal antitrust law against monopolization,126
because LinkedIn sought to disadvantage hiQ’s analytics services
119 See, for example, PeopleBrowsr, Inc v Twitter, Inc, 2013 WL 843032, *1 (ND Cal)
(PeopleBrowsr alleged Twitter anticompetitively denied it access to Twitter user data);
eBay, Inc v Bidder’s Edge, Inc, 100 F Supp 2d 1058, 1073 (ND Cal 2000) (eBay was unsuccessfully accused of anticompetitively preventing companies from gathering auction data
from its website); LiveUniverse, Inc v MySpace, Inc, 304 Fed Appx 554, 555–57 (9th Cir
2008) (plaintiff video content provider unsuccessfully alleged that MySpace abused its
dominance under a refusal to deal theory by prohibiting its users from sharing LiveUniverse content on their profiles); Craigslist Inc v 3Taps Inc, 942 F Supp 2d 962, 967 (ND
Cal 2013).
120 See generally Eleanor Tyler, 2019 Outlook: Online Giants Loom Large in Antitrust
Law, Policy (Bloomberg, Dec 31, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/7PKA-K5NU.
121 273 F Supp 3d 1099 (ND Cal 2017).
122 Unlike Facebook, which shields user profiles behind password protections,
LinkedIn lets users make their data searchable by the public. See id at 1104.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17200 et seq.
126 See hiQ, 273 F Supp 3d at 1117.
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while promoting its own.127 The Northern District of California
granted a preliminary injunction because the court considered it
plausible that LinkedIn restricted hiQ’s public data access in order
to limit competition with its in-house analytic services.128
LinkedIn argued that the decision granting the preliminary
injunction should be reversed because, under Trinko, it was not
obligated to provide competitors access to data in its possession.
LinkedIn further argued it had valid business justifications for its
refusal, namely preventing hiQ from free riding on its investments in professional networking and protecting its users’ privacy.129 Lastly, LinkedIn claimed hiQ could not invoke the antitrust laws to protect its scraping when that behavior was itself
illegal under the CFAA.130
hiQ and amici countered that shutting off access to public
data makes the internet less open and dynamic, to the detriment
of innovation and consumer welfare. Furthermore, they claimed
that LinkedIn sought to accept the benefits of publishing data
while avoiding the costs, in that it had profited from the web traffic and advertising revenues enjoyed by public websites while
seeking to prevent its competitors from analyzing the data it
publicized.131
In September 2019, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction on the grounds that hiQ’s business model depended on public data, which could only be feasibly accessed

127

Id at 1118.
It is not clear exactly what theory of monopolization the court envisioned.
LinkedIn’s scraping prohibition might be exclusionary in that it “leveraged” LinkedIn’s
monopoly power in the professional networking market to enter the professional analytics
market. Alternatively, the prohibition might have been an attempt to monopolize the professional analytics market itself. See id.
129 See Appellant’s Opening Brief, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 17-16783, *21–
22 (9th Cir filed Oct 3, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 4518160) (LinkedIn Opening Brief).
130 See Appellant’s Reply Brief, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 17-16783, *26–27
(9th Cir filed Dec 11, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 6371609) (LinkedIn Reply
Brief).
131 See Plaintiff-Appellee hiQ Labs, Inc’s Answering Brief, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn
Corp, No 17-16783, *1–3 (9th Cir filed Nov 20, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL
5632775) (hiQ Answering Brief). See also Electronic Frontier Foundation Brief at *3 (cited
in note 9):
128

These rules [for data access] should not allow the handful of companies that collect massive amounts of user data to reap the benefits of making that information publicly available online—i.e., more Internet traffic and thus more data
and more eyes for advertisers—while at the same time limiting use of that public
information.
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through LinkedIn public profiles.132 The court doubted the propriety of LinkedIn’s data scraping prohibition under the UCL, explaining that “[i]f companies like LinkedIn, whose servers hold
vast amounts of public data, are permitted selectively to ban only
potential competitors from accessing and using that otherwise
public data, the result—complete exclusion of the original innovator in aggregating and analyzing the public information—may
well be considered unfair competition.”133
Furthermore, the court dismissed LinkedIn’s proffered justifications for the scraping prohibition. LinkedIn could not credibly
argue that the prohibition served its users’ privacy because, like
hiQ, LinkedIn shared its users’ data with third-parties for commercial purposes.134 Similarly, LinkedIn could not persuasively
claim the prohibition was justified as a measure against free riding because LinkedIn did not claim ownership of the data at issue,
and users clearly intended to make their profiles publicly accessible.135 By ruling against LinkedIn, the court showed its concern
that giving companies “free rein to decide . . . who can collect and
use data . . . risks the possible creation of information monopolies
that would disserve the public interest.”136
In an earlier data scraping case, Authenticom, Inc v CDK
Global, LLC,137 an analytics firm called Authenticom scraped and
analyzed data from car dealer websites operated by defendants
CDK Global and Reynolds. Before 2015, CDK’s website was open
to the public, permitting Authenticom to scrape its data, while
Reynolds’s website was closed to those without password credentials.138 In 2015, CDK closed its website, citing cybersecurity concerns, which effectively prevented Authenticom from gathering
and analyzing data.139 Concurrently, CDK and Reynolds entered
132

hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, 2019 WL 4251889, *5 (9th Cir).
Id at *9.
134 Id at *6.
135 Id.
136 hiQ, 2019 WL 4251889 at *15. While hiQ’s success at the preliminary injunction
stage indicates that courts may consider refusal to deal liability for scraping prohibitions,
it is noteworthy that hiQ alleged abuse of dominance under the UCL rather than the
Sherman Act, as the UCL allows for more expansive monopoly liability than federal antitrust law. The UCL proscribes all violations of the federal antitrust laws but also prohibits
“conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or
spirit of one of those laws.” hiQ, 273 F Supp 3d at 1117 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). See also Cel-Tech Communications, Inc v Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co, 973 P2d
527, 565 (Cal 1999) (Baxter concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137 874 F3d 1019 (7th Cir 2017).
138 Id at 1021–22.
139 Id at 1022.
133
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bilateral agreements to share data with each other.140 CDK and
Reynolds both offered analytics services that competed with
Authenticom and were able to demand significantly higher prices
after CDK denied Authenticom access.141
Authenticom sued CDK, alleging that its data sharing agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.142 Notably, Authenticom did not bring claims
under Section 2 because neither CDK nor Reynolds had monopoly
power in the dealer management service market.143 No antitrust
law imposes a duty to deal on firms without monopoly power, so
the refusal to deal doctrine would be at best persuasive outside
the Section 2 context.
Nonetheless, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, which required CDK and Reynolds to give Authenticom limited access to their websites so it could gather the data necessary
to continue providing analytics services.144 The injunction implied
Authenticom had a right to access the data under the antitrust
laws, which could only arise under a Section 2 refusal to deal theory.145 The Seventh Circuit overturned the injunction because
CDK’s decision to close its website to scrapers was separate from
the defendants’ data sharing agreement. Therefore, even if the
data-sharing agreement violated Section 1, the proper remedy
would be to remove the offending restraint of trade, not to create
a new contractual relationship that forced the defendants to “do
business with Authenticom on terms to which they did not
agree.”146
Furthermore, the court indicated that this particular case
would fall outside the scope of Aspen Skiing even if allegations
had been brought under Section 2. Forcing Reynolds to open a
website that had always been closed to the public and empowering a court to dictate the terms of a new business relationship
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Id.
Authenticom, 874 F3d at 1023.
142 Authenticom alleged the sharing agreements were unreasonable restraints of
trade in that they eliminated competition in the data integration industry. Id.
143 Id at 1026 (“Authenticom has not argued that either Reynolds or CDK has sufficient market power on its own to trigger either a monopolization or an attempt-tomonopolize claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act.”).
144 Id at 1024.
145 Authenticom, 874 F3d at 1026.
146 Id.
141
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would offend the principles of Trinko.147 The court did not foreclose the possibility, however, that an internet monopolist operating a public website could be liable under Section 2 for exclusionary data scraping prohibitions.148
hiQ and Authenticom show that plaintiffs are beginning to
raise antitrust concerns regarding scraping prohibitions in the
courts. These cases raise the possibility of using refusal to deal
liability to address those concerns. However, because neither case
involved a Section 2 claim and both evaluated preliminary injunctions, rather than the full merits,149 neither case thoroughly adjudicated whether data scraping prohibitions may be unlawful under Section 2. Part III addresses this unresolved question.
III. IMPOSING REFUSAL TO DEAL LIABILITY FOR DATA SCRAPING
PROHIBITIONS
Whether a monopolist can incur Section 2 liability for denying competitors access to public data remains an open question
after hiQ and Authenticom. This Part analyzes the propriety and
feasibility of imposing refusal to deal liability for data scraping
prohibitions. It assumes a fact pattern in which a hypothetical
internet monopolist denies its competitor access to public data
through scraping prohibitions.150 Furthermore, it takes as given
that the hypothetical defendant possesses monopoly power in the
relevant market151 and that the hypothetical plaintiff competes

147 Id (“[T]his case is a far cry from Aspen Skiing, which represented the high-water
mark in section 2 cases for a duty-to-deal theory.”).
148 By limiting the case to the facts, the court did not foreclose the possibility of other
scraping prohibitions violating Section 2.
149 See hiQ, 273 F Supp 3d at 1120; Authenticom, 874 F3d at 1026–27.
150 It is easy to imagine future cases similar to these idealized facts because tech companies often spar over access to data. In 2010, for example, Google and Facebook reciprocally blocked each other’s access to users’ contact information. See Alexei Oreskovic,
Google Bars Data from Facebook as Rivalry Heats Up (Reuters, Nov 5, 2010), archived at
http://perma.cc/AM4M-WJRJ. If Google had alleged that Facebook’s measures to prevent
data collection were intended to protect its social media monopoly against threats from
Google+, that hypothetical litigation could have involved refusal to deal liability for scraping prohibitions. Similarly, the news that Facebook deliberately withholds user data from
competitors while freely supplying that data to companies that pose no threat could invite
refusal to deal claims. See Solon and Farivar, Mark Zuckerberg Leveraged Facebook User
Data (cited in note 1).
151 In this context, monopoly power would entail dominance over an internet-based
market, such as social/professional networking, e-commerce, or search.
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with the defendant in that market.152 Part III.A argues that restrictions on data access pose a significant threat to digital competition, and refusal to deal liability for scraping prohibitions provides an incremental step toward more robust antitrust
enforcement to confront that threat. Part III.B contends that
scraping prohibitions should be analyzed through an intent test
framework. Part III.C argues that operating a public website and
freely supplying data to the public should be considered a “course
of dealing” with internet users, broadly. Finally, Part III.D proposes a balancing standard for adjudicating whether scraping
prohibitions are exclusionary and outlines the factors courts
should consider when applying that standard.
A.

Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions as an Incremental
Solution to Digital Antitrust Concerns

The appropriateness of imposing refusal to deal liability for
scraping prohibitions depends on whether digital monopolists’
ability to restrict data access poses a serious risk to competition.
If digital monopolists have not harmed consumers and their control of data poses no significant barrier to entry, as Chicago School
proponents would likely suggest, Section 2 liability for data scraping prohibitions would be unnecessary. However, if Chicago
School critics are correct that access to data is required for viable
competition in the digital economy, scraping public data may enable rivals to gather information and pose a competitive check on
incumbent monopolists. It is difficult to say conclusively which
view is correct, especially because the harms contemplated by exclusionary conduct in the digital economy consist of less innovation or less internet vibrancy rather than more quantifiable
harms like higher prices or lower quantities.153
Because data is a crucial input for digital product development, it is evident that data access has become critical to internet

152 This is similar to the fact pattern in hiQ though without complications regarding
which market LinkedIn allegedly sought to monopolize. See note 128.
153 See Khan, 126 Yale L J at 721–22 (cited in note 46) (“[I]t is fair to say that a
concern for innovation or non-price effects rarely animates or drives investigations or enforcement actions.”); Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in National Bureau of Economic Research, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 619–22 (Princeton 1962) (arguing that
the scale of innovation depends on the amount of market competition).
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competition and likely will become even more so.154 Therefore,
companies with access to data have an advantage that they may
use for exclusionary ends. Furthermore, multisided platforms,155
like Facebook, Google, Amazon, and LinkedIn, can leverage their
scale to gather considerable shares of useful internet data.156 For
example, LinkedIn certainly controls a significant portion of professional network data relevant for companies offering analytics
in that field.157 Lastly, the risk that data access restrictions could
reduce innovation and dynamism in the digital economy, though
less salient than the threat of higher prices, is cause for concern
and should be a focus of the Section 2 enforcement regime.
These concerns militate in favor of liability for anticompetitive scraping prohibitions. However, Chicago School adherents
who wish to limit refusal to deal enforcement are right to worry
that overactive courts can distort markets and that enforced sharing could harm competition by disincentivizing investment. While
it is probable (or at least possible) that liberal access to data
would create a more vibrant digital economy, it is also possible
that preventing monopolists from guarding their data would disrupt their investment expectations and hinder innovation in the
long run.
Luckily, thanks to the broad language of Section 2 and the
common law, the incrementalist approach courts have taken in
defining its prohibitions offers a solution to the antitrust concerns
posed by monopolists’ control of data.158 One benefit of a common
law approach is that courts can take small steps in one direction

154 See Symons and Bass, Me, My Data and I at *25 (cited in note 4) (“[C]ompanies
which control large amounts of data raise barriers to entry for potential rivals because
they do not have the same ability to use the data to make competitive products.”).
155 The antitrust risks associated with scraping prohibitions are not limited to multisided platforms but, because these platforms have a unique capacity to accumulate data,
their use of scraping prohibitions to restrict data access is particularly concerning. See
Part II.B.
156 See Stucke, 2 Georgetown L Tech Rev at 275 (cited in note 2) (“Through [Apple,
Google, Amazon, and Facebook’s] leading platforms, a significant volume and variety of
personal data flows. The velocity in acquiring and exploiting this personal data helps these
companies obtain significant market power.”).
157 See Scraping Hub Brief at *20 (cited in note 19):

LinkedIn is plainly attempting to ensure that no firm other than itself is able to
profitably analyze the mountains of publicly-available information that it maintains on its servers. LinkedIn seeks that result not by producing superior analytical products, but by excluding its competitors from information that its users
have placed in the public domain.
158

See Part I.
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while leaving themselves a path back if new rules appear imprudent. Furthermore, this approach lets courts experiment their
way toward efficient rules.159
In comporting with the Sherman Act common law process,
imposing refusal to deal liability for anticompetitive scraping prohibitions offers an incremental step toward more vigorous antitrust enforcement regarding restrictions on data access.160 Liability for those prohibitions will allow courts to test, in a minimally
invasive way, whether more robust monopoly enforcement in the
internet context will discourage investment or lead to a more competitive digital environment.
Furthermore, data scraping prohibitions offer a fitting context to expand refusal to deal liability because several of the
Court’s primary worries in Trinko are of little concern. For example, the Court’s fear that refusal to deal liability would turn courts
into central planners is not relevant in this context. Compelling
digital monopolists to permit automated collection of public data
does not require courts to set prices, quantities, or other commercial terms because the data had previously been offered to web
users for free. There is also little reason to believe enforced sharing will induce collusion in the data scraping context. Apart from
programmatically accessing the monopolists’ servers, scrapers
and monopolists would have no meaningful interactions, as scraping does not require affirmative assistance from the monopolist.
In addition, false positives (that is, incorrectly condemning scraping prohibitions as exclusionary) would be unlikely to disincentivize monopolists’ investments in the public data scraping context.
Monopolists have chosen to make this data available to the public
for free. While they have invested considerably in the platforms
on which users publicize the data, they have calculated that freely
supplying it to the internet encourages web traffic and benefits
their businesses.161 It is unlikely they would be discouraged from
159 See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv L Rev
457 (1897).
160 Some commentators have argued that refusal to deal liability could obtain under
rare circumstances when defendants close their platforms with intent to extend their monopoly power by denying competitors access to unique data. See Howell, Big Data and
Monopolization at *18–22 (cited in note 21).
161 Some argue Section 2 liability for data scraping prohibitions will encourage monopolists to withdraw data from the public by imposing password authentication. See, for
example, LinkedIn Opening Brief at *15 (cited in note 129). However, this seems unlikely
because the platform business model directly benefits from greater viewership. Furthermore, it stands to reason that companies that could profitably cloister data behind password protections or paywalls would have already done so.
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investing just because they are compelled to allow access to that
information through automated means. Lastly, unlike the telecommunications industry in Trinko, the internet platform industry is lightly regulated.162 According to the Court’s reasoning in
Trinko, antitrust enforcement may add more value in this context
because no other statutory framework exists to deter and remedy
anticompetitive harms.
B.

The Case for the Intent to Monopolize Test

If courts are willing to proscribe anticompetitive data scraping prohibitions through the refusal to deal doctrine, as this Comment argues they should, they must consider whether to analyze
prohibitions under the intent test or the essential facilities framework. The essential facilities doctrine may seem like an intuitively appealing framework for analyzing scraping prohibitions
because data is an indispensable resource for internet competition. However, the intent test is preferable for several reasons.
First, the essential facilities doctrine has never been endorsed by
the Supreme Court and has been fairly unsuccessful in the lower
courts.163 The Court has also refused to give the doctrine credence
and has cast its propriety into doubt without explicitly overruling
it.164 Therefore, from a pragmatic perspective, plaintiffs face an
uphill battle when seeking antitrust liability on essential facilities grounds.
The essential facilities doctrine also allows for less consideration of valid business justifications. Some courts argue applying
it runs a greater risk of improperly condemning procompetitive
behavior.165 Given Trinko’s anxiety regarding false positives,166
lower courts may be more willing to find data scraping prohibitions exclusionary if the test gave defendants adequate opportunity to defend their behavior.
Relatedly, the intent test allows for more case-by-case analysis because it hinges on whether a monopolist intended to reduce
162 See Rana Foroohar, Why We Need to Regulate the Tech Platforms (Financial
Times, Nov 5, 2017), online at http://www.ft.com/content/84f402ac-bfc0-11e7-b8a3
-38a6e068f464 (visited Apr 30, 2019) (Perma archive unavailable).
163 Of a sample of eighty-two notable essential facilities cases, only seven resulted in
verdicts for the plaintiffs. 2 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 25.04 at *21 (cited in
note 69).
164 See Frischmann and Waller, 75 Antitrust L J at 3 (cited in note 114). See also
Part II.A.4.
165 See 2 Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 25.04 at *22 (cited in note 69).
166 Trinko, 540 US at 414.
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competition by refusing to deal. By contrast, the essential facilities doctrine focuses on whether it is necessary and feasible for a
monopolist to allow access to the resource in question.167 An improper ruling for the plaintiff under an intent theory will likely
create narrower precedent for that reason because imposing liability on the monopolist is contingent on the monopolist’s state of
mind in that circumstance rather than the nature of the resource
itself. Courts may be more likely to extend liability under the intent test after Trinko because they will have less reason to fear
the precedential effect of false positives.
C.

Freely Supplying Data to the Public as a Voluntary Course
of Dealing

Despite the advantages of the intent test, some of its requirements pose challenges for proscribing anticompetitive data scraping prohibitions. Most notably, the voluntary course of dealing element could pose a significant hurdle.168 The Trinko court held in
Verizon’s favor because its dealings with competitors were compelled by statute, making clear that a prior voluntary relationship
was a key factor for liability under Aspen Skiing.169
While this is an exacting standard, freely supplying data to
the public should be considered a voluntary course of dealing with
internet users at large. Just as users of Facebook and Google have
commercial relationships with those companies despite enjoying
their products for free, the fact that public data is offered at no
cost should have little bearing on whether internet monopolists
have created a voluntary relationship by supplying it to the web.
Furthermore, monopolists supplying data to the public do not
do so for charitable reasons. In exchange for granting access to
the data, they benefit from greater web traffic and the accompanying revenues.170 They are party to a quasi-contractual relationship in which they barter data for viewership.
Moreover, no court has stressed that the existing course of
dealing need be strictly contractual for refusal to deal liability to
attach. Trinko primarily emphasized that the relationship should
be voluntary—that is, not compelled by law.171 Unlike Trinko,

167
168
169
170
171

See Frischmann and Waller, 75 Antitrust L J at 3 (cited in note 114).
See Part II.A.2.
Trinko, 540 US at 409. See also Part II.A.2.
See Electronic Frontier Foundation Brief at *3 (cited in note 9).
See Trinko, 540 US at 409.
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there is no indication that companies involuntarily supply data to
the public.
Post-Trinko, lower courts have insisted on voluntary courses
of dealing largely because enforced sharing is less likely to induce
collusion among firms in existing business relationships, and existing business relationships do not require courts to set prices or
other commercial terms.172 As noted above in Part III.A, these
concerns are less relevant for data scraping prohibitions, so courts
may view the voluntary course of dealing requirement as less vital in the scraping context. To the extent that courts are hesitant
to find prior courses of dealing when websites simply distribute
data to the public, perhaps liability for refusal to deal could be
limited to circumstances in which a website provider knows (and
tacitly allows) data scrapers to gather and process data from their
sites, as was the case in hiQ.173
Lastly, while some lower courts have insisted on longstanding commercial relationships to satisfy the course of dealing element, others consider the presence of a course of dealing as
merely probative evidence that the monopolist intended its refusal to deal to be exclusionary.174 Therefore, perhaps courts will
not dwell on the nature of the relationship between the scraper
and the digital monopolist but will instead holistically evaluate
the evidence of exclusionary intent.
D. Courts Should Apply an Effects-Balancing Test to Assess
Exclusionary Conduct in Data Scraping Cases
Courts must also determine a standard for assessing whether
a given data scraping prohibition is exclusionary. Over time,
courts and enforcement agencies have offered several tests for defining exclusionary conduct. Among those tests are (1) the effectsbalancing test, (2) the profit sacrifice test, (3) the no economic
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See, for example, Novell, 731 F3d at 1074–75.
hiQ, 273 F Supp at 1107 (“[D]espite the fact that hiQ has been aggregating
LinkedIn’s public data for five years with LinkedIn’s knowledge, LinkedIn has presented
no evidence of harm, financial or otherwise resulting from hiQ’s activities.”).
174 Compare Steward Health Care System, LLC v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode
Island, 311 F Supp 3d 468, 484 (D RI 2018) (“[N]o prior course of dealing is immaterial.”),
quoting Helicopter Transport Services, Inc v Erickson Air-Crane Incorporated, 2008 WL
151833, *9 (D Or), with Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co v Shire LLC, 754 F3d 128, 135 (2d
Cir 2014) (finding refusal to deal liability was unavailable because the defendant “did not
terminate any prior course of dealing—let alone a ‘presumably profitable’ one”).
173
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sense test, (4) the equally efficient competitor test, and (5) the disproportionality test.175 The Supreme Court has not specified a test
to apply for refusal to deal litigation. In Trinko, the Court noted
in dicta that, to conclude a monopolist’s refusal to deal is exclusionary, there should be some indication the monopolist sacrificed
short-term profits for long-run exclusionary gain, but the Court
did not mandate the profit sacrifice test, specifically, to make that
assessment.176 Therefore, lower courts may conduct whichever
test they consider suitable to assess whether prohibitions are anticompetitive.177 This Section first argues that courts should apply
the effects-balancing test, and then evaluates the primary arguments that they should consider regarding scraping prohibitions’
competitive effects and their valid business justifications.
1. The effects-balancing test for evaluating exclusionary
conduct.
A good standard for evaluating exclusionary conduct strikes
the right balance of decision and error costs, which fosters competition, promotes judicial administrability, and provides firms
with legal clarity.178 For that reason, courts should apply the
effects-balancing test to assess whether data scraping prohibitions are exclusionary.179 Effects-balancing is preferable to arguably clearer and more administrable standards, such as the
175 Competition and Monopoly at *viii–x (cited in note 25). See Part I.A for a more
complete discussion of the various tests courts and enforcement agencies have developed
for assessing exclusionary conduct.
176 Indeed, the Antitrust Modernization Commission considered whether a balancing
standard would be appropriate for evaluating allegedly exclusionary conduct in refusal to
deal cases, notwithstanding the Trinko Court’s emphasis on profit sacrifice. The Commission’s primary concerns with that standard related to its administrability, not its consistency with the governing case law. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and
Recommendations at *102 (cited in note 67).
177 Many courts have adopted a profit-sacrifice standard in the wake of Trinko. See,
for example, Novell, 731 F3d at 1080 n 5; SmithKline Beecham Corp v Abbott Laboratories,
2014 WL 6664226, *4 (ND Cal). However, other courts have adopted the balancing standard for evaluating exclusionary conduct advanced in United States v Microsoft Corp, 253
F3d 34, 59 (DC Cir 2001) to assess refusals to deal. See, for example, URL Pharma, Inc v
Reckitt Benckiser, Inc, 2015 WL 5042911, *7−9 (ED Pa) (analyzing whether the procompetitive effects of the defendant’s refusal to deal outweighed its anticompetitive
consequences).
178 See Thomas A. Lambert, Defining Unreasonably Exclusionary Conduct: The ‘Exclusion of a Competitive Rival’ Approach, 92 NC L Rev 1175, 1204−05 (2014).
179 If a monopolist’s scraping prohibition were found to be exclusionary, a court would
have broad discretion regarding the appropriate remedy. For example, the court could enjoin the offending behavior (in this case, denying competitors data access), or it could
award the plaintiff treble damages based on the harm the scraping prohibition caused to
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profit-sacrifice test (which asks whether the monopolist chose to
forgo short-term profits for an exclusionary purpose)180 or disproportionality test (which asks whether the conduct’s anticompetitive effect vastly outweighs its procompetitive results) because it
will reduce the false negatives inherent to those tests. The balancing test is the broadest standard that courts employ, and it
would allow liability whenever they determine data scraping prohibitions would impede competition in the digital economy. It is
particularly well-suited to the data scraping context because, as
previously noted, some scrapers gather data for illegitimate purposes.181 Therefore, a fact-intensive inquiry into a monopolist’s
motivations for shutting access is necessary to avoid false positives while condemning scraping prohibitions that restrain
competition.
The effects-balancing approach surely imposes significant decision costs because requiring courts to evaluate the net competitive effect of a monopolist’s conduct demands significant judicial
resources.182 Because it is an amorphous balancing standard rather than a bright-line rule, the effects-balancing test might also
provide prospective defendants with less ex ante legal guidance.
Relatedly, the balancing approach could be difficult to execute because assessing all of the results of a monopolist’s behavior would
be complicated.183 The Chicago School may favor tests that prioritize administrability over accuracy and that encourage restraint
in antitrust enforcement. However, the Chicago paradigm underestimates the unique threat digital monopolists pose to competition by controlling stores of data, and the Chicago School’s antitrust regime generally fails to check anticompetitive restrictions
on data access.184 A broader, more inclusive standard is necessary

the competitor’s business. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and
Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 Antitrust L J 11 (2009).
180 Despite the Trinko Court’s dicta regarding evidence of profit sacrifice in refusal to
deal cases, the profit-sacrifice test is particularly ill-suited to the data scraping context.
Monopolists do not seek immediate returns when they post public data online, so it would
be impractical to ask whether their decision to cut off access evidenced a short-term profit
sacrifice.
181 See notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
182 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations at *102–
03 (cited in note 67).
183 For criticisms of the effects-balancing approach, see Competition and Monopoly at
*37−38 (cited in note 25).
184 See Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations at
*102−04 (cited in note 67).
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to correct the anticompetitive threat digital monopolists pose in
this context.185
2. Net competitive effects of data scraping prohibitions.
In evaluating whether data scraping prohibitions are anticompetitive under an effects-balancing approach, courts should
analyze several factors. First, courts should consider both the monopolist’s intended purpose for its scraping prohibition and the
scraper’s intended use for the public data. For example, did the
monopolist selectively shut off data access to businesses with
which it competes while welcoming scraping bots from noncompeting businesses?186 This might indicate the monopolist seeks to
deploy the prohibitions specifically to impair rivals’ ability to
compete.
Second, courts should consider the nature of the public
data.187 For example, will denying competitors access to the data
chill innovation in the digital economy, or is the data inessential
or available elsewhere? Relatedly, courts should consider whether
restricting access to data will prevent competitors from offering
products that consumers demand, much like the court in Aspen
Skiing determined that the monopolist had denied consumers the
ability to purchase joint tickets.188
Courts should next consider the scraper’s motivations for
gathering data. Is the scraper collecting information simply to
create a knockoff version of the monopolist’s website, or does the
scraper intend to create a novel product or insight? Scrapers who
gather information to offer new innovations benefit consumers
with greater variety and efficiency. They should be entitled to
more antitrust protection than those who simply copy preexisting
ideas from monopolists.

185 Other academic papers have argued for a balancing test in refusal to deal cases.
See, for example, Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in
Intellectual Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish between IP and Other
Property Rights, 19 Berkeley Tech L J 741, 762 (2004) (arguing that a “rule of reason”
balancing approach is necessary to combat the anticompetitive threat of monopolists’ unilateral refusals to license intellectual property).
186 See, for example, Scraping Hub Brief at *2 (cited in note 19) (“The critical issue
underlying this appeal is whether a data monopolist such as LinkedIn may criminalize
perfectly proper behavior and thereby selectively bar competitors and other entities from
electronically accessing data.”).
187 See Howell, Big Data and Monopolization at *19 (cited in note 21).
188 Aspen Skiing, 472 US at 603.
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Furthermore, courts should conduct classical antitrust
analyses in which they evaluate the effect of a monopolist’s conduct on consumer welfare. This might involve determining
whether data scraping prohibitions will reduce the number of
competitors in a monopolist’s market, allowing them to increase
prices or reduce quality for paying customers or for advertisers.189
Courts should lastly consider whether mandating access to
public data would enable free riding in a manner that significantly reduces monopolists’ incentives to invest. Monopolists will
argue that supplying data to the public does not mean they consent to its use for any purpose. Courts would therefore dissuade
future investments in public data if they allow free access for
scrapers ex ante, which monopolists would never have agreed
to.190 Monopolists may also draw on Chicago School principles and
claim requiring automated access for scrapers denies them the
exclusive right to process and market their data, which impedes
their efforts to maximize profits. By striking data scraping prohibitions under Section 2, courts would consequently hinder monopolists’ efforts to vigorously compete and disincentivize the future
development of open digital platforms, contrary to the primary
aim of the antitrust laws.191
However, whatever investment expectations monopolists
have in the data they make available to the public must be limited, considering they have already distributed the information to
internet users for free. Furthermore, even if denying scrapers programmatic access to public data is the most profitable strategy
from the monopolist’s perspective, it is not necessarily best for the
competitive health of the digital economy. Giving competitors automated access to data could put the data to more innovative uses

189 See Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed
Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 Antitrust L J 311, 331 (2006) (“[T]he evaluation is really
about whether consumers are harmed from higher prices, reduced quality, or (in some
cases) reduced innovation[.] Thus, a better term might well be a ‘consumer harm’ standard
rather than a ‘consumer welfare effect’ standard.”).
190 See, for example, LinkedIn Reply Brief at *9 (cited in note 130) (“hiQ wants
LinkedIn to turn over that information in a commercially advantageous form that would
allow hiQ to free-ride on LinkedIn’s investment. LinkedIn has no antitrust duty to give
hiQ that shortcut.”).
191 See, for example, Sokol and Comerford, 23 Geo Mason L Rev at 1160 (cited in note
56) (“Using antitrust as a sword to address Big Data concerns risks reducing competition
and innovation from new products.”).
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and improve consumer welfare, notwithstanding its effect on monopolists’ bottom lines.192 Lastly, one of the benefits of applying
the intent test in conjunction with a balancing standard is that
scraping prohibitions should be condemned only when monopolists use them specifically to create or maintain market power.
Therefore, in instances when internet monopolists selectively
deny data access for valid business purposes not intended to exclude competition, they should be free from liability under this
standard.
3. Evaluating valid business justifications for data
scraping prohibitions.
Courts must give monopolists adequate opportunity to present valid business justifications for their data scraping prohibitions to reduce the risk of false positives. First, courts should consider whether mandating scraper access would prevent
monopolists from safeguarding their users’ privacy. Perhaps users have expectations that their personal information will be used
for the enumerated purposes outlined in the website’s terms and
conditions, and data scrapers do not abide by those terms. Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that internet users have significant privacy expectations in data they know is made available to all
internet users.193 And furthermore, ending data scraping does
little to prevent third parties from acquiring users’ data because
internet companies routinely sell or exchange personal data with
other firms.194
Second, courts should consider whether data scraping significantly interferes with the monopolist’s website, for example, by
taxing its servers. However, this may be unlikely given that
scraping bots simply gather data as it appears on users’ computer

192 See Abrahamson, 124 Yale L J at 879 (cited in note 21) (observing that public data
can power a variety of applications over time—from predicting social unrest to directing
humanitarian aid—and therefore “resemble technologies that support multiple rounds of
innovation”).
193 But see Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) in
Support of Neither Party Urging Reversal, hiQ Labs, Inc v LinkedIn Corp, No 17-16783,
*5 (9th Cir filed Oct 10, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 4698992) (“Users who
join LinkedIn provide detailed personal information to the company, and they reasonably
expect that LinkedIn will uphold its end of the bargain by protecting their data from unauthorized disclosure and misuse.”).
194 See Alexis C. Madrigal, Facebook Didn’t Sell Your Data; It Gave It Away (The
Atlantic, Dec 19, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/VGR9-VYPN.
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screens and companies rarely bar the myriad robots that engage
with their sites.195
Lastly, courts should consider whether monopolists can justify denying scrapers access as a means to deter free riders who
did not invest in the infrastructure necessary to generate this
data.196 Antitrust defendants routinely justify their conduct as
necessary to prevent free riding.197 Courts, however, lack a coherent framework to determine when monopolists disguise exclusionary measures as efforts to retain the benefits of their investments.198 Courts should protect monopolists’ investment
incentives but cannot let them use free riding accusations as pretext to suffocate competition. In the scraping context, monopolists
may argue that their motivation to innovate in the internet space
depends on whether courts protect their data investments. But it
is questionable whether granting monopolists strong property

195 See, for example, hiQ Answering Brief at *10 (cited in note 131) (“[C]ounsel could
not identify any server impairment from hiQ’s activities and conceded that LinkedIn allows other commercial enterprises, including Google and Yahoo!, to programmatically analyze the site.”).
196 For example, LinkedIn argued that hiQ was free riding by gathering and processing data from LinkedIn public profiles. See LinkedIn Opening Brief at *10 (cited in
note 129). Evidently, LinkedIn believes it has some property interest in the data, despite
not claiming ownership of it, because the user-generated data would not exist but for
LinkedIn’s investment in the platform. This is reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s holding
in International News Service v Associated Press, in which the Court held that a news
organization had quasi-property interests in non-copyrightable factual information due to
the efforts expended to gather it. Consequently, a rival organization that appropriated the
news had competed unfairly. 248 US 215, 239–40 (1918). However, the idea that gathering
publicly disseminated information not subject to copyright protection is unfair competition
has been hotly disputed. See, for example, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc v DeCosta,
377 F2d 315, 318 (1st Cir 1967) (“International News Serv[ice] . . . is no longer authoritative . . . as it prohibited the copying of published written matter that had not been copyrighted.”). See also National Basketball Association v Motorola, Inc, 105 F3d 841, 845 (2d
Cir 1997) (limiting property interests in facts to time-sensitive information and to instances when free riding on plaintiff’s fact gathering would “substantially threaten[ ]” its
“existence or quality”).
197 See, for example, Fashion Originators’ Guild of America, Inc v Federal Trade Commission, 312 US 457, 461 (1941) (claiming anticompetitive group boycotts were necessary
to prevent free riding on defendants’ fashion innovations); Ohio v American Express, 138
S Ct 2274, 2289–90 (2018) (arguing vertical restraints were necessary to prevent free riding on American Express’s investment in a consumer network). See also John M. Newman,
Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 Ind L J 501, 509–13 (2019) (describing
how antitrust defendants justify their behavior as remedies for market failures, such as
free riding).
198 See Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 916 (2007)
(Breyer dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to determine just when, and where, the ‘free riding’
problem is serious enough to warrant legal protection.”).
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rights over public data would foster more innovation than a competitive digital economy with liberal access to information.199
Moreover, preventing free riding on a digital monopolist’s investment might not be a compelling justification when the monopolist
has distributed the data to the public at no charge. Likewise, the
fact that monopolists invest in internet infrastructure should not
entitle them to internalize all of its positive externalities, in this
case by dictating who can access the public data they post and
how.200 In general, even the most exclusionary refusals to deal will
likely feature accusations of free riding, as competitors would not
seek a monopolist’s business if they did not stand to gain from
access to its infrastructure, intellectual property, or other investments. Consequently, allegations of free riding cannot, in themselves, quash refusal to deal claims if the doctrine is to be a viable
Sherman Act enforcement tool. By leaving ample room for valid
business justifications, the effects-balancing approach will allow
courts to distinguish between data scraping prohibitions that improve user experience and protect monopolists’ investment expectations and those prohibitions meant to neutralize competitive
threats.
In sum, data scraping prohibitions pose a sufficient threat to
competition to merit an antitrust remedy, and the refusal to deal
doctrine offers an incremental solution to that threat. Courts
should apply the intent test to assess refusal to deal liability because precedent has treated the intent test more favorably than
the essential facilities doctrine and it risks fewer false positives.
Furthermore, the effects-balancing test is appropriate for evaluating whether scraping prohibitions are exclusionary because it
is the most inclusive and least error prone standard. Applying
effects-balancing to scraping prohibitions will create a more open
and dynamic internet while allowing monopolists to protect their
investment when doing so would not stifle competition.

199 See Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and
the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 193, 215–17 (1999) (discussing economic literature that suggests challenges from rising competitors have a larger effect on
firms’ incentive to innovate than profits from intellectual property rights).
200 Even intellectual property protections do not let businesses profit from every benefit of their investments. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free
Riding, 83 Tex L Rev 1031, 1041−42 (2005) (noting how intellectual property protections
do not allow owners to internalize all social benefits of their innovations). User-generated
data is generally not covered by copyright or trademark protections, so there is no reason
why monopolists should expect a greater share of externalities than they would be entitled
for intellectual property.
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CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued in favor of imposing liability under
the refusal to deal doctrine for anticompetitive data scraping prohibitions. Given the state of refusal to deal law after Trinko and
the prevailing conservative approach to antitrust enforcement inspired by the Chicago School, liability under these circumstances
would likely constitute a slight expansion of the doctrine. Furthermore, evaluating liability under an effects-balancing approach would impose significant decision costs on fact finders.
However, liability under these circumstances is necessary to combat the significant competitive risk of digital monopolists selectively denying rivals access to public data for exclusionary purposes. As the internet becomes increasingly central to the
economy and data becomes ever more critical to viable competition, it will be crucial to prevent dominant companies from leveraging their control of data to quell competition. Refusal to deal
liability in the data scraping context offers an incremental and minimally invasive tool to combat this competitive threat. Applying the
doctrine to data scaping would also be much less radical than other
proposed interventions in the digital economy, such as breaking up
technology companies. Courts should embrace their common law
approach to antitrust jurisprudence by imposing liability whenever
data scraping prohibitions would reduce competition.

